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How and Why Race Continues to Influence the
Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana
Robert J. Smith and Bidish J. Sarma∗
In the final analysis, though, I am bound to enforce the laws of
Louisiana as they exist today, not as they might in someone’s
vision of a perfect world. That is what I have done. And that is
what I must continue to do.
Reed Walters, district attorney in LaSalle Parish responsible for
prosecuting the Jena Six (Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2007).
[These laws] do not on their face discriminate between the
races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration
was evil; only that evil was possible under them. It follows,
therefore, that the judgment [upholding these laws] must be
affirmed.
Unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898), which upheld
property qualifications, educational qualifications, and other
means explicitly designed to prevent African Americans from
being qualified to vote.
INTRODUCTION
On May 12, 2010, we went to the Louisiana Supreme Court to
argue on behalf of a death row inmate in State v. Dressner.1 The
case emerged from Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. At trial, the
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude seven of

Copyright 2012, by ROBERT J. SMITH AND BIDISH J. SARMA.
∗ A significant portion of this Article originates from three sources. See
Bidish J. Sarma, An Enduring (and Disturbing) Legacy: Race-Neutrality, Judicial
Apathy, and the Civic Exclusion of African-Americans in Louisiana, 1 HLRe 49
(2011); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal
Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425 (2010); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith,
Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACE BIAS ACROSS THE LAW
(forthcoming 2012). We view this Article as a culmination of our recent writing on
race and the criminal justice system, and an opportunity to discuss our personal
experiences as practicing death penalty lawyers in Louisiana.
1. Bidish Sarma and Robert Smith served as co-counsel for Dustin
Dressner on direct appeal of his capital conviction.
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nine qualified prospective black jurors.2 Only one person of color
ultimately sat on the jury, despite the fact that African-American
residents constituted approximately 25% of the population in the
Parish.3 Four years earlier, attorneys from our office urged the
Louisiana Supreme Court to reverse another case out of Jefferson
Parish where the State had struck every one of the five qualified
prospective black jurors. The prosecutor in that case told reporters
that it was his “O.J. [Simpson] case” and later pleaded with jurors
not to let Allen Snyder get away with it like O.J. did.4
While briefing and arguing Dressner, we recognized that the
distance between the post-Reconstruction legacy of racism in
Louisiana and the present day administration of justice—much like
the distance between the quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Williams v. Mississippi and the statement from Reed Walters—
is not as far as one may wish to believe.5 The prosecutor at Mr.
Dressner’s trial had gone so far as to suggest that he struck
African-American prospective jurors because they espoused views
that were friendly to the State. Nevertheless, the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied the claims of prosecutorial race
2. See Unpublished Appendix at *8 n.8, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127
(La. 2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors).
3. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts: Jefferson
Parish, LA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22051.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011); see also RICHARD BOURKE, JOE HINGSTON & JOEL DEVINE, LA.
CRISIS ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY
DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2003), available at http://www.blackstrikes.
com/resources/report/black_strikes_report_september_2003.doc.
4. See State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 498–99 (La. 2006), rev’d, Snyder
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld Mr.
Snyder’s conviction and rejected the claim of racial discrimination, but in
Snyder v. Louisiana, a 7–2 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
5. Indeed, in the atrium of the Louisiana Supreme Court, a portrait of
Ernest Benjamin Kruttschnitt prominently hangs directly to the left of the main
entrance. E.B. Kruttschnitt was the legal architect of a system that was designed
to ensure the “supremacy” of the Anglo-Saxon race through terms that would
avoid the scrutiny of “Massachusetts” judges. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1898, at 381
(1898) [hereinafter LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION JOURNAL]. In
1898, more than 25 years after the Reconstruction Amendments provided
African-American citizens with the right to participate in their government,
Louisiana held its second Constitutional Convention. Serving as its President,
Kruttschnitt called into order what he deemed to be “little more than a family
meeting of the Democratic party of the State of Louisiana.” Id. at 8–9. In the
end, he vowed to “protect the purity of the ballot box and to perpetuate the
supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race in Louisiana.” Id. at 381.
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discrimination, rejecting them in an unpublished appendix.6 Yet,
the question of whether the State continues to discriminate because
of skin color ought not be buried or forgotten.7 Indeed, the racial
disparities reflected across a number of criminal justice contexts in
Louisiana warrant fresh inquiry.8
This Article seeks to add texture to the analysis of how and
why race influences the criminal justice system. It considers three
mechanisms that exclude black citizens from jury service at a
disproportionate rate and thus dilute their influence: (1) nonunanimous jury verdicts; (2) discriminatory peremptory
challenges; and (3) death-qualification. It details how African
Americans are systematically disenfranchised from participating in
the administration of justice and why these processes drive
substantively unequal outcomes. The Article’s aim is primarily
descriptive. Part I provides the contemporary context, setting out
the racial disparities that pervade Louisiana’s criminal justice
system. These outcomes are largely a result of the processes that
are numbered above and explored in the four parts that follow. Part
II explores how the laws enacted by nineteenth-century white
supremacists continue to operate today, and do so—regardless of
modern intent—in a way that executes their intended
discriminatory purposes. Part III discusses the State’s use of
peremptory challenges. These challenges do not stem from
discriminatory origins but nonetheless perpetuate racial exclusion.
Part IV describes the racial impact that death-qualification has on
juries’ composition in capital cases. Part V concludes, observing
that these factors are both interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
Each factor causes negative feedback loops that inhibit the ability
of minority group members to participate meaningfully in the
justice system and exact political change.

6. See generally Unpublished Appendix, Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La.
2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors).
7. See Smith v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1020 n.* (1991) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The fact that the Court of Appeals’
opinion is unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient
means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in
the [jurisdiction] and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a
published opinion.”).
8. See infra Part I.

364

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

I. THE OUTCOMES TRIGGERING THE DEEPER INQUIRY: RACIAL
DISPARITIES PERMEATE LOUISIANA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In Louisiana, racial disparities permeate the criminal justice
system.9
African-American
citizens
are
significantly
overrepresented in the criminal justice system.10 Within the subset
of society’s most serious criminal offenses—homicides (including
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter)—
prosecutors disproportionately seek the death penalty against
African Americans, and juries disproportionately sentence African
Americans (especially those accused of murdering white victims)
to execution.11 And, at the same time the system locks up and
harshly sentences racial minorities, it also ensures they are underrepresented or unrepresented on criminal juries.12 State action
plays a significant role in creating and maintaining these racial
disparities.
A. Incarceration Rates and Disparate Policing
The United States incarcerates a greater percentage of its
citizens than any other country.13 Louisiana is the epicenter of the
trend:14 it incarcerates 1 in every 55 adults, more than any other
state in the nation.15 If one includes every person that is under the
control of the corrections system in Louisiana, whether they be
incarcerated, paroled, or on probation, the number climbs to 1 in

9. See discussion, infra, Part I.A–C.
10. See, e.g., LA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,
CORRECTIONS SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic Profiles of the Adult
Correctional Population (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.corrections.
state.la.us/wp-content/uploads/stats/2a.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death-Sentencing in
East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
12. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
13. See, e.g., INT’L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, Entire World—Prison
Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population, http://www.prison
studies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last
visited Oct. 12, 2011); NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE
OF SENTENCING 2010: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (Feb. 2011),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/Final%20State%20of%
20the%20Sentencing%202010.pdf.
14. See David Crary, Study: Louisiana Has the Highest Incarceration Rate,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.pachiefprobation
officers.org/docs/panews3_28_8.pdf.
15. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS tbl. A-4 (Mar. 2009), http://www.pewcenteronthe
states.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
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every 26 adults.16 Before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans itself
had more people in its local prison per capita than any other major
city in the United States.17 The increasing prison population is
relevant because the State continues to disproportionately
incarcerate racial minorities, especially its black citizens. Over
70% of all prisoners in Louisiana are African-American, despite
the fact that African Americans constitute 32% of the State’s
population.18
These disparities can be seen in patterns of racialized policing.
The now-deceased Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry Lee19 famously
told reporters: “We know the crime is in the black community.
Why should I waste time in the white community?”20 A March
2011 Department of Justice Report on the New Orleans Police
Department noted “troubling disparities in [the] treatment of the
City’s African-American community,” and concluded that the
“NOPD has failed to take sufficient steps to detect, prevent, or
address bias-based profiling and other forms of discriminatory
policing on the basis of race . . .”21 A major consequence of racial
profiling is the disproportionate arrest rate of black citizens—and
16. Id. at tbl. A-6.
17. NAT’L PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU, ABANDONED AND ABUSED:
ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2006),
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf.
18. See William Arp III & Berlisha Morton, A Political History and
Analysis of Disenfranchisement and Restoration of the Black Vote in Louisiana,
29 W.J. BLACK STUD. 629, 630 (2005) (“More than 72.9% of the incarcerated in
Louisiana are Black, 26.9% are Whites, and 0.2 % represents the ‘Other’
category.”); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts: Louisiana,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
19. Sheriff Harry Lee is also largely responsible for the searing images of
armed guards blocking New Orleans residents desperately trying to escape the
floods of Hurricane Katrina from crossing the Crescent City Connection Bridge
into Jefferson Parish. See, e.g., Bruce Eggler, Bridge Blockade After Katrina
Remains Divisive Issue, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 1, 2007, available at
http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/09/bridge_blockade_after_katrina. html
(“Not only did the blockade spawn state and federal investigations and five
lawsuits targeting Gretna, its police force, Lawson, Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry
Lee and other law enforcement agencies, the episode vaulted the New Orleans
area’s historical struggle with race and class onto an international stage.”).
20. See, e.g., John Burnett, Larger-Than-Life Sheriff Rules Louisiana
Parish, NPR, Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=6549329. Sheriff Lee ordered his Deputies to stop and question “young
blacks in rinky-dink cars” driving in white neighborhoods. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for Petitioner,
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119).
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 35, 32 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf.
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thus higher absolute number of black citizens swept into the
system—for drug crimes. One in four inmates (27.6%) in
Louisiana is incarcerated for a drug offense.22 In New Orleans,
drug use and other non-violent crimes account for as much as 45%
of the population of pre-trial prisoners at the notoriously
overcrowded Orleans Parish Prison at any given time.23 Though
drug use nationally is roughly consistent among white and black
individuals,24 black citizens are significantly over-represented for
drug arrests.25 This translates into more black citizens, and
particularly young, black men, being arrested, taken away from
their communities, and coming home with felon status that makes
obtaining employment and voting incredibly difficult,26 and
serving on a jury impossible.27 The problem is apparent not only in
Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish, but statewide.28
22. LA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS
SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic Profiles of the Adult Correctional
Population (30 June 2011), available at http://www.corrections.state.la.us/wpcontent/uploads/stats/2a.pdf.
23. James Austin, Wendy Ware, & Roger Ocker, Orleans Parish Prison
Ten-Year Inmate Population Projection tbl. 13 (Nov. 2010), www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/233722.pdf (showing that drug possession represents 3.8%,
drug sales represent 8.7%, theft, fraud and forgery represent 4.7%, “other
property” represents 1.6%, and “other nonviolent” offenses represent 26.7%).
24. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, RESULTS FROM THE 2008
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 25 (2009),
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k8nsduh/2k8Results.pdf.
25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Mar. 2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf.
26. No person under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony
can vote. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:102(A)(1) (Supp. 2011). Although
Louisiana law provides for the restoration of voting rights to individuals
convicted of felonies who are no longer under parole or probation, see LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18:177(A) (2004), the task of restoring the right to vote in practice
is much more difficult than the law’s text suggests. See, e.g., Traci Burch,
Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General
Election, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 699, 707 (2011) (“[T]he economic and social
burdens associated with criminal convictions severely restrict the ability of
offenders to garner resources such as time, money, and civic skills that would
help them participate in politics after they serve their time.”). Moreover, the
state cannot provide any meaningful information about the restoration of rights.
See Arp & Morton, supra note 18, at 636 (“The lack of data regarding
restoration of felons’ right to vote suggests Louisiana’s indifference towards the
restoration of voting rights.”).
27. See, e.g., Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S.
Prison Policy: Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM.
PSYCHOL. 709, 716 (1998).
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. Death Row
Racial disparities also reach the administration of the ultimate
punishment. Louisiana’s death row is 65% black,29 which means it
has a greater percentage of African Americans than any other state
with at least ten people sentenced to die by execution.30 Recent
research in two Louisiana parishes responsible for a significant
percentage of the state’s total death sentences indicates that the
race of the victim is a statistically significant factor in determining
who receives the death penalty.31 Although empirical evidence
suggests that African Americans have committed a higher
percentage of the homicides in Caddo and East Baton Rouge
Parishes than whites, it also demonstrates that a very small
percentage are sentenced to death for black-on-black killings, and a
much higher percentage face the death penalty for interracial
homicides.32 The disparities that defined Louisiana’s death penalty
history are not an artifact33 but continue to haunt capital
punishment in the state today.
C. Jury Participation
Black citizens continue to be excluded from jury service in
Louisiana, especially in the most serious criminal cases. In capital
cases, it is not uncommon for juries to include zero or one black
person, despite dramatically higher African American
representation in the parish population.34 For instance, in an
amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v.
Louisiana, a group of African-American ministers observed that
29. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
DEATH ROW U.S.A. 35 (Winter 2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/DRUSA_Winter_2010.pdf; see also LOUISIANA DEP’T OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Demographic
Profiles of the Death Row Correctional Population (30 June 2011), available at
http://www.corrections.state.la.us/wp-content/uploads/stats/2d.pdf.
30. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 29, at 35–36.
31. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11; Tim Lyman, Comparing Homicides
to Capital Cases Caddo Parish, 1988–2008 (2011) (unpublished comment),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743712.
32. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 658, 661; Lyman, supra note 31,
at 2, 3.
33. See, e.g., Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 652–54 (summarizing the
racial history of Louisiana’s death penalty).
34. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475–76 (2008) (all-white
jury); Unpublished Appendix at *8, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010)
(No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors) (one African-American juror); State v.
Draughn, 950 So. 2d 583, 604 (La. 2007) (one African-American juror); State v.
Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. 2002) (one African-American juror).

368

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

race discrimination in Jefferson Parish capital cases was the norm
rather than the exception:
In capital murder cases such as Snyder’s, the problem has
been particularly stark. As reflected in available decisions
and Louisiana Supreme Court records, Jefferson Parish
prosecutors struck all or all but one qualified AfricanAmerican venirepersons in eleven capital cases, including
Jacobs and Harris. These prosecutions occurred both before
and after Allen Snyder’s trial. In a twelfth case, the
prosecutors attempted to strike all but one qualified African
American, but the trial judge intervened and ordered that a
second African-American venireperson be seated.35
Similarly, a group of ministers in Caddo Parish recently
objected to the repeated discrimination in jury selection in capital
cases in that Parish, noting that black citizens represent almost
50% of the population but often times constitute only 25% of
capital juries.36 These trends also exist in non-capital cases. A
recent report by the Equal Justice Initiative, for instance,
documents that 80% of criminal trials in Jefferson Parish have no
effective black representation given that non-unanimous verdict
rules permit ten white jurors to effectively ignore the voice of one
or two jurors who are members of racial minority groups.37
The process by which black citizens are excluded is multifaceted. Residents who do not have a permanent address may not
receive jury summons or meet the baseline residency
requirement.38 Those who cannot arrange transportation or find
childcare may not arrive at the courthouse in the first place, or may
be excused for hardship.39 Residents who have been convicted of a
felony and remain unpardoned are disqualified.40 Black citizens

35. Brief of Nine Jefferson Parish Ministers as Amici Curiae for Petitioner
at 8–9, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119).
36. See Motion of Amici Curiae for Leave to File Memorandum in Support
of Defendant’s Application for Subpoena Duces Tecum, Louisiana v. Tucker,
No. 273,436 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. 2011) (seeking review of jury demographics
to understand this disparity).
37. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 5 (Aug. 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/files/IllegalRacialDiscriminationJurySelection.pdf [hereinafter ILLEGAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION].
38. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(1) (Supp. 2011) (requiring
residency).
39. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 783(B) (2003) (allowing jurors
suffering hardship to be excused at the trial court’s discretion).
40. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(5) (Supp. 2011).
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tend to be disproportionately represented in these circumstances.41
Once black citizens arrive at the courthouse, prosecutors often use
challenges to eliminate a disproportionate number of black
jurors.42 These varied factors result in limited participation of
African-American jurors on criminal juries.
D. The Overall Picture
These racial disparities—consistent across a number of
contexts, from striking jurors on the basis of their race to arrests
for suspected drug crimes to imposition of death sentences—reflect
that race continues to matter in Louisiana’s criminal justice system.
This observation may not surprise people familiar with the
incarceration statistics or who have personal experience with the
system. But, the claim that official decision-makers either hold
overt racial animosities or stand idly by knowing that the criminal
justice system treats black residents differently than white residents
has not inspired systemic change. Some skeptics downplay the
significance of the claim.43 These commentators characterize our
nation as a “Post-Racial America,” and refer to counter-typical
examples, like Barack Obama becoming the first black President of
the United States,44 or Bobby Jindal becoming the first non-white
Governor of Louisiana since Reconstruction,45 as evidence.46

41. See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury
Operations: Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section
Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 772–77 (2011).
42. See infra Part III.
43. See, e.g., Lydia Saad & Frank Newport, Blacks and Whites Differ About
Treatment of Blacks in America Today, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE 58 (July 6,
2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4585/blacks-whites-differ-about-treatmentblacks-america-today.aspx.
44. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Editorial, Racial
Gerrymandering Is Unnecessary, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at A15
(suggesting “the doors of electoral opportunity in America are open to all”).
45. Alex Spillius, Is Bobby Jindal Presidential Material?, THE TELEGRAPH,
May 5, 2008, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/alexspillius/3934721/Is_Bobby_
Jindal_presidential_material/ (“Jindal . . . is ‘post-racial’ in a very Obamian
fashion.”).
46. Perhaps the mind boggling and extended “birther” debate about
Obama’s birth certificate will put to rest any notion that his election marked the
end of racial bias in American electoral politics. See, e.g., Eric Hahman et al.,
Evaluations of Presidential Performance: Race, Prejudice, and Perceptions of
Americanism, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 430 (2011); Leonard Pitts
Jr., Birther Debate Has Racist Undercurrent, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2011
(decrying the debate as “profoundly racist claptrap”).
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Bobby Jindal himself made a similar statement47 on the night he
became the first Indian Governor elected in the history of the
United States: “In America, the only barrier to success is a
willingness to work hard and play by the rules.”48
Unfortunately, a willingness to work hard and play by the rules
is not the only prerequisite for the type of civic engagement49 that
promotes positive intergenerational change.50 The racial disparities
in arrests and sentencing in Louisiana are real, as are the practices
that dilute the participation of black citizens in the rendering of
justice. A narrow understanding of how society works generally,
and how the criminal justice system functions specifically, will not
serve the state well. And, the issue is not primarily that Louisiana
residents harbor explicitly racist views.51 To chalk up these
recurring racial disparities solely to allegedly racist actions by
legislators, police officers or prosecutors would be inaccurate and

47. Governor Jindal also once said of Louisiana, “You know, this has been
a great place to grow up. The great thing about the people of Louisiana is that
they accept you based on who you are.” Keshni Kashyap, The Bobby Jindal
Racism Issue, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
blogs-and-stories/2009-03-04/the-bobby-jindal-racism-puzzle/.
48. Billy Sothern, Bobby Jindal: Not Much to Celebrate, THE NATION, Oct.
29, 2007, available at: http://www.thenation.com/article/bobby-jindal-notmuch-celebrate. In order for Governor Jindal to believe the words he spoke, he
had to have
looked past the fact that many of the people exposed to that crisis
[Hurricane Katrina] were willing to work and play by the rules; their
road to success, however, was barred by an education system ranked
among the worst in the country, streets filled with violent crime and
few decent-paying jobs for those who did manage to escape all of the
other snares of living poor in Louisiana.
Id.
49. See generally Gordon Bazemore & Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Civic
Engagement and Reintegration: Toward a Community-Focused Theory and
Practice, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241 (2004).
50. See generally Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice:
Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259 (2009).
51. But see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does
Unconscious Bias Matter: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J.
1053, 1068 (“The great contribution of the [Implicit Association Test] may be
not that it captures a new type of bias, so much as that it employs a subtle and
sophisticated means of measuring bias, which has become ever more elusive as
research participants attempt to outsmart any test that would label them a
racist.”); B. Keith Payne et al., Why Do Implicit and Explicit Attitude Tests
Diverge? The Role of Structural Fit, 94 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.
16–31 (2008) (“[M]easuring implicit responses is less like an archeological dig
and more like fishing in a river. Implicit tests tap attitudes upstream, but explicit
tests catch what flows downstream, muddied in the editing for public report.”).
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misguided.52 However, to disregard or deny altogether the State’s
responsibility for these stark racial realities would be equally
unwise.
II. NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS
Community participation in the administration of the criminal
law . . . is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is
also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system.53
Perhaps the most meaningful way in which a person can
participate in the criminal justice system is to serve on a criminal
jury. The right to a trial by jury was enshrined in our Constitution
in large part to check governmental overreaching.54 Jurors––
interposed between the government and the individual defendant––
play the crucial role of determining whether the government has
proved its charges, and whether punishment is warranted. In other
words, a criminal juror possesses the solemn responsibility to
render justice. Not only is jury participation a momentous way for
minorities to participate in the administration of justice, but it is
also one of the few roles readily and realistically available to
them.55

52. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 11, at 671 (“[R]acial bias . . . can very
well be unintended and not recognized by the individual decision makers
themselves.”).
53. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See also Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (“When any large and identifiable segment of the
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530–31
(“[T]he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly
as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention,
if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial
by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.”).
55. African Americans are severely under-represented as judges, district
attorneys, and defense attorneys. ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note
37, at 41–43 (examining the lack of African Americans in these decision-making
roles in Southern states).
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African Americans are vastly under-represented on criminal
juries in Louisiana.56 The disproportionate removal of AfricanAmerican citizens is not an accidental feature of the criminal
justice system. Instead, it is the intentional result of discriminatory
historical mandates, compounded today by seemingly neutral
policies and practices that exacerbate already racially disparate
outcomes.57 To understand history’s influence, one must revisit the
Colfax Massacre that took place on Easter Sunday in 1873.
A. The Historical Backdrop
Nearly five years had passed since the country ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, granting citizenship and its privileges to
every person born in the United States. And, just over three years
had passed since the country ratified the Fifteenth Amendment,
providing black citizens with the right to vote. These Amendments
were direct attempts to heal the black eye that the Dred Scott58
decision inflicted on the nation. The gospel of racial enlightenment
had yet to make its way to the city of Colfax in Grant Parish,
Louisiana, however. As Justice Thomas described in his
concurring opinion in McDonald v. Chicago, on that Easter
Sunday in 1873, “members of a white militia . . . brutally
murdered as many as 165 black Louisianans congregating outside
a courthouse . . . .”59 The story behind this tragedy, known as the
“Colfax Massacre,” began with the Louisiana Governor’s race of
1872 and continued with the practical demise of the
Reconstruction Amendments in the South.60
After the violence, federal officials ultimately arrested 97 militia
members.61 Federal prosecutors secured indictments under freshly
56. See, e.g., ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37, at 5, 14, 23–
24; see generally Nijole Benokraitis, Racial Exclusion in Juries, 18 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. SCI. 29 (1982).
57. See discussion infra Part II.A–D.
58. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), the Court held that no
person of African descent was a citizen under Article III. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
407 (upholding the history by which people of African descent had “no rights
which the white man was bound to respect . . . [they] might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for [their] benefit . . . and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic . . . .”).
59. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
60. For a comprehensive history, see CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM
DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
61. Sonja R. West, No Civilized System of Justice, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 521,
526 (2008) (reviewing LANE, supra note 60) (noting that federal prosecutors
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minted federal civil rights legislation aimed at enforcing the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.62 Nine militia members
proceeded to trial, and juries returned guilty verdicts against three of
them, including William Cruikshank, who, as Justice Alito noted in
McDonald, “himself allegedly marched unarmed African-American
prisoners through the streets and then had them summarily
executed.”63 The defendants in the Colfax massacre were found
guilty of conspiring to violate the privileges enjoyed by all citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the privilege of
associating together peaceably and the right to bear arms.64
Cruikshank appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari to address whether the statute under which the
convictions were secured violated the scope of federal power. The
Court cited the ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases65 when it held
in United States v. Cruikshank that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause did not provide the federal government with the authority to
prosecute state residents with violations of individual
constitutional rights unless those rights emanated directly from the
Constitution (rather than from a source that predated the
Constitution and its Amendments).66 The upshot of the SlaughterHouse Cases and Cruikshank was to render the Reconstruction
Amendments and Civil Rights legislation unenforceable.67
Writing in United States v. Louisiana, then-United States
District Court Judge Wisdom recounted the sordid history that
followed the Colfax Massacre:
In 1874 six white Republican officeholders of Red River
Parish were killed, after they had surrendered and had
agreed to leave the State. . . . Representative white citizens

initially secured indictments against 97 militia members on 32 counts under the
Enforcement Act).
62. Id. at 525.
63. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.
64. Id.
65. In the now infamous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment did
not constrain Louisiana from granting a monopoly to a single entity in Orleans
and surrounding parishes to exercise the right to maintain slaughterhouses and
cattle-yards to the exclusion of all other butchers and cattle-owners. SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
66. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1876).
67. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1339–40 (1952); Wilson R. Huhn, The
Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1079–80 (2009).
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considered it a civic duty to belong first to The Knights of
the White Camelia, a secret organization equivalent to the
Ku Klux Klan in other states, and, later, to join the White
League, a statewide organization which openly advocated
white supremacy in a published platform. On September
14, 1874, the Crescent City (New Orleans) White League,
which was organized militarily, led by influential citizens,
successfully fought a pitched battle in New Orleans against
3000 of [Republican Governor] Kellogg’s Negro militia,
1000 Metropolitan Police under General Longstreet, and
several hundred federal troops. The White League took
over complete control of the City, then the Capitol of
Louisiana, and established in the Statehouse Acting
[Democrat] Governor Penn and, later, [Democrat]
Governor McEnery.68
In the face of these erupting racial tensions, Northern political
leaders abandoned their duty to protect black citizens. For
example, in April 1877, President Rutherford Hayes, as part of the
Hayes–Tilden compromise that landed him the Presidency after a
hotly disputed election,69 removed federal troops from Louisiana
and recognized the Democratic Administration as the legal
government of the state.70 As Judge Wisdom wrote, these events
foreshadowed subsequent infamous racial lowlights, such as “the
lily white primary, [which] marked the emergence of the
Democratic party in the south as the institutionalized incarnation of
the will to White Supremacy . . . .”71
B. The 1898 Constitutional Convention Implements the NonUnanimous Jury Verdict Policy
After employing brute force to capture the Louisiana
government in the 1870s, the Democrats used the 1898
Constitutional Convention to steal suffrage from African-American
citizens.72 As the Convention’s President, Ernest Benjamin
Kruttschnitt revealed that the sinister purpose of the Convention
68. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 353, 366–68 (E.D. La. 1963)
(footnotes omitted).
69. Theodore B. Olson, The Supreme Court & the Presidency, 9 GREEN
BAG 2d 139, 145 (2006) (“The disputed election of 1876 had almost led to
another civil war.”).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. at 368–69.
71. Id. at 368 (internal quotations omitted).
72. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law:
Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 303
(2000).
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was to create a racial architecture in Louisiana that could
circumvent the Reconstruction Amendments and marginalize the
political power of black citizens.73 The Chairman of the
Convention’s Judiciary Committee, Judge Thomas Semmes, held
nothing back: “We [are] here to establish the supremacy of the
white race, and the white race constitutes the Democratic party of
this State.”74 Or, as Judge Wisdom wrote, “[t]he Convention of
1898 interpreted its mandate from the [Louisiana] people to be, to
disfranchise as many Negroes and as few whites as possible.”75
The Delegates achieved these anti-participation goals not only
by restricting access to the ballot box but also by diluting the voice
of members of racial minority groups by allowing non-unanimous
jury verdicts in criminal cases.76 The historical record from the
Constitutional Convention demonstrates clearly that the delegates
were preoccupied with disenfranchising African-American voters,
but reflects little discussion on the non-unanimous jury policy.77
However, contemporaneous accounts of how white supremacists in
Louisiana responded to black jury participation during
Reconstruction amply demonstrate what animated their decisions
at the Convention.78
The non-unanimous verdict policy enabled the state to prevent
an African American from hijacking sentencing outcomes:
He [the freed slave] does not appear to much advantage in
any capacity in the courts of law . . . . As a juror, he will
follow the lead of his white fellows in causes involving
distinctive white interests; but if a negro be on trial for any
crime, he becomes at once his earnest champion, and a
hung jury is the usual result. At a recent trial in Limestone
County, Texas, a colored juror refused to send a murderer
to State Prison for life, because, as he said, it looked too
73. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 5, at
380.
74. Id. at 374.
75. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 371 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
76. See LA. CONST. OF 1898, art. 116 (“[C]ases in which the punishment is
necessarily at hard labor, [shall be tried] by a jury of twelve, nine of whom
concurring may render a verdict . . . .”); LA. CONST. OF 1974, art. I, § 17 (“A
case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a
verdict.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782 (2009) (“Cases in which punishment
is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of
twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.”).
77. See supra notes 72–75.
78. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
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much like putting the man into bondage; but readily
consented to a verdict of 99 years’ imprisonment.79
Moreover, black jurors were viewed as ignorant, incapable of
determining credibility, and susceptible to bribery.80 One
commentator went so far as to claim that criminals would simply
not be convicted because of the African-American presence in the
jury box.81 These overtly racist views captured the beliefs of the
Convention’s delegates and set the backdrop for the Constitutional
Convention, the non-unanimous jury verdict policy, and their
ongoing effects today.
C. Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts Today
Louisiana’s policy of non-unanimous jury verdicts continues to
limit meaningful African-American participation today. For
example, in 2009, the foreman of Corey Miller’s82 jury said the
jurors had found him guilty of second-degree murder.83 When the
judge polled the jurors individually, however, he found nine jurors
voted for conviction, two for acquittal, and one for a conviction
“under duress.”84 The final vote rendered the verdict invalid. The
judge refused to declare a mistrial, and sent the jury back for
further deliberation.85 Three hours later, and after 13 total hours of
deliberation, the jury returned with a 10–2 guilty verdict, which
meant Mr. Miller would be automatically sentenced to life without
79. Future of the Freedman, DAILY PICAYUNE, Aug. 31, 1873, at 5.
80. See The Present Jury System, DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 1870, at 4; see
also Female Suffrage, DAILY PICAYUNE, May 8, 1879, at 4 (arguing that women
“should no longer be treated as aliens, as the State needs their votes now . . . to
neutralize those of the vicious and ignorant, who have no financial or other
interest in the community unless it be to rob the treasury”).
81. See The Present Jury System, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 1870, at 4
(“[N]egroes . . . [are] capable only of being corrupted by bribes to espouse the
side of criminals willing to pay for verdicts . . . . [A]s things go now, criminals
have but slight fear of losing their life or liberty on indictments and jury trials.”).
82. Robert J. Smith, along with co-counsel Charles Ogletree, Ronald
Sullivan and John Adcock, represents Mr. Miller on appeal.
83. This was the second time he faced trial on the same murder charge. The
State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence at his first trial, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial in light of
the State’s misconduct. See State v. Miller, 923 So. 2d 625 (La. 2006).
84. See, e.g., C.J. Lin, Metairie Woman Says She Voted to Convict CMurder to End ‘Brutal’ Jury Deliberations, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 26, 2009
[hereinafter Brutal Deliberations], available at: http://www.nola.com/crime/
index.ssf/2009/08/metairie_woman_says_she_vocted.html.
85. See id.; see also C.J. Lin, C-Murder Guilty of Second-Degree Murder
After Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 11, 2009, available at:
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/08/cmurder_verdict_1.html.
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the possibility of parole.86 Two weeks later, Mary Jacobs, the juror
who switched her vote to guilty, told the Times-Picayune that she
did not believe the State proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, but voted guilty nonetheless under “brutal” pressure from
other jurors directed at the dissenting jurors, and at one young
black juror in particular.87 Jacobs explained:
They [the other jurors] literally made this 20-year-old girl
so violently ill . . . She was shaking so bad. She ran into the
bathroom. She was throwing her guts up. She couldn’t
function anymore. That’s when I decided, the judge don’t
want to listen to me, doesn’t want to listen to us? I told
them, “You want him to be guilty? He’s guilty, now let’s
get the hell out of here.”88
The public reaction to the news centered less on the juror that
changed her vote than the decision–rule itself. Forty-eight states
and the federal system require criminal juries to render unanimous
jury verdicts. Louisiana is one of only two jurisdictions in the
country that allows less-than-unanimous verdicts in criminal
cases.89 Somewhat surprisingly, the Times-Picayune published
pieces about Mr. Miller’s case with titles including: “How [10–2]
verdict policy hurts black defendants,”90 “10–2 jury close enough
for Louisiana,”91 and “C-Murder guilty of second-degree murder
after topsy-turvy jury action.”92 As the titles of those articles
imply, there was a palpable racial component to the 10–2 rule in
this case. Indeed, three black jurors served on Mr. Miller’s jury—
two voted to acquit him.93

86. See Lin, Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, supra note 85 (“At the defense’s
request, the jury was polled and the vote was revealed to be 10–2 in favor of
conviction. Ten of 12 votes are required for a second-degree murder
conviction.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2009) (providing for mandatory
life-without-parole sentence for second-degree murder).
87. See Lin, Brutal Deliberations, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
136.450 (Westlaw 2011).
90. Annette Sisco, How Verdict Policy Hurts Black Defendants, TIMESPICAYUNE, Aug. 27, 2009, available at http://blog.nola.com/jamesgill/2009/08/
how_verdict_policy_hurts_black.html.
91. Annette Sisco, 10-2 Jury Close Enough for Louisiana, TIMESPICAYUNE, Aug. 15, 2009, available at http://blog.nola.com/jamesgill/2009/
08/102_jury_close_enough_for_loui.html.
92. See Lin, Topsy-Turvy Jury Action, supra note 85.
93. See Sisco, supra note 90 (“Two of the three black jurors in the Miller
case held out for acquittal.”).
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D. The Detrimental Impact that Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts
Have on Justice and Meaningful Participation
In Apodaca v. Oregon,94 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the practice of non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital
cases. The Apodaca plurality largely based its decision on the
belief that the decision rule had no practical effect on jury
deliberations.95 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial requires only that the defendant have “the judgment of
his peers interposed between himself and the officers of the State
who prosecute and judge him” and that such an interest is “equally
well served” by non-unanimous juries.96 Similarly, in Apodaca’s
companion case, Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court held that 9-3 jury
verdicts do not violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and expressed “our view that the fact of three
dissenting votes to acquit raises no question of constitutional
substance about either the integrity or the accuracy of the majority
verdict of guilt.”97
The dissenters disagreed, arguing that allowing non-unanimous
juries “eliminates the circumstances in which a minority of jurors
(a) could have rationally persuaded the entire jury to acquit, or (b)
while unable to persuade the majority to acquit, nonetheless could
have convinced them to convict only on a lesser-included
offense.”98 The dissent also criticized the majority’s speculation
that non-unanimous jury verdicts produced the same quality of
deliberations as unanimous verdicts, noting how “human
experience teaches that polite and academic conversation is no
substitute for the earnest and robust argument necessary to reach
unanimity.”99 The dissenters expressed fear that the first arguments
to be ignored would be those expressed by members of identifiable
minority groups.100
Social science research produced since Apodaca and Johnson
bolsters the view of the dissenters. Decision rules have an impact
on both the quality and outcome of the deliberation: unanimous
94. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
95. Id. at 411 (“[W]e perceive no difference between juries required to act
unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11
to one.”); id. at 410 (finding that a unanimity requirement “does not materially
contribute to the exercise of this common sense judgment”).
96. See id. at 411.
97. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 402 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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juries deliberate longer,101 discuss and debate the evidence more
thoroughly,102 reach more reliable conclusions (as measured by the
percent of votes consistent with the judge’s view of the
evidence),103 and are more tolerant and respectful of dissenting
voices.104 Jurors who participated in trials where a unanimous
verdict was required report being more satisfied with their
experience than jurors who operated under a non-unanimity rule.105
There is also evidence that the non-unanimous decision rule
operates to silence the view of minority group members.106
In Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, Professor Kim TaylorThompson explained that the views of minority group members
often are excluded from serious consideration when they are in the
minority (number) of jurors.107 She writes,
[b]ecause our system of justice charges the jury with
evaluating the conduct of the accused, the jury can benefit
from the observations and comments of individuals who
share at least one socializing characteristic or who may
have had some common experiences with the accused.
These jurors can offer narratives to guide the jury’s
understanding—or perhaps rejection—of the accused’s
interpretation of events.108
Housing patterns in many cities consist of neighborhoods with
a high concentration of minority group members.109 These
101. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 60 tbl. 4.1 (1983).
102. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272–73 (2000); AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N,
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 24, available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/american_jury/final_commentary
_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberations, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 669
(2001).
104. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity
Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 201, 230 (2006).
105. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How
Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 41 (1997).
106. See, e.g., Hon. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the
Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2008); PRINCIPLES FOR
JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, supra note 102, at 24.
107. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102.
108. Id. at 1279.
109. See generally Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated
Housing Patterns and the Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 55 (2002); William H. Carter et al., Polarisation, Public Housing, and
Racial Minorities in US Cities, 35 URBAN STUDIES 1889 (1998).
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neighborhoods often also suffer from concentrated poverty and
violence.110 So the perspective that is missing in cases where
defendants or victims are minority group members is not only that
which comes from sharing a culture or group identity but often the
one that comes from living in areas where crime is a fact of life.
Richard Wright’s Native Son captures an extreme form of this
dynamic.111 A wealthy white woman from Chicago tells the
protagonist, a poor, black man named Bigger Thomas that, though
she has traveled around the world, she has no knowledge of how
people live in the poorer, blacker neighborhoods of the city just
blocks from where she grew up. Wright says that Bigger Thomas
knew then that he could never explain to a white person of
privilege why he committed murder because “the telling of it
would have involved the explanation of his entire life.”112
One practical example of where this difference in perspective
could arise is in the believability of testimony that a police officer
planted evidence. Following the O.J. Simpson trial, 78% of black
respondents believed the jury reached the correct verdict, while
fewer than 50% of white respondents thought so.113 Post-O.J. trial
polling also revealed that nearly three of four black respondents as
compared to one in four white respondents believed the criminal
justice system is biased.114
These divergent perspectives on law enforcement have deep
roots. A study conducted by Professor Jen Crocker found that 84%
of black participants (but just 4% of white participants) agreed that
it “might possibly be true” or “definitely [is] true” that “the
government deliberately makes sure that drugs are available in
110. See e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 125–42
(1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20–108 (1987).
111. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940).
112. Id. at 356.
113. Darnell M. Hunt, (Re)Affirming Race: “Reality,” Negotiation, and the
“Trial of the Century”, 38 SOC. Q. 399, 400 (1997); see also Richard Morin,
Poll Reflects Division Over Simpson Case: Trial Damaged Image of Courts,
Races Agree, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at A31 (citing poll that found 55% of
white Americans thought Simpson was guilty and 85% of African Americans
thought he was innocent); Leland Ware, Essays on Race Reach Beyond the
Superficial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 1996, at 5D (“[T]he reaction to
the verdict proves, beyond any doubt, that white and black Americans view the
same events from vastly different perspectives”).
114. Russell Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1100 (2008) (citing CBS News/New York Times O.J. Simpson Poll #2, July
1994) (“In 1994, a CBS News/New York Times poll found that roughly 40% of
blacks, compared to 15% of whites, believed that the criminal justice system
was biased against Simpson.”).
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poor Black neighborhoods.”115 Interpreting Crocker’s results,
Professor Russell Robinson suggests that differing levels of
historical understanding could account for the disparity.116
Another set of concerns goes to the core of reliable trial
verdicts. The viewpoint of racial minorities who are in the minority
position on a criminal jury is particularly important in instances
where eyewitness identification is the primary type of evidence.
Evidence that cross-racial identifications are more error-prone than
same-race identifications is overwhelming,117 and more recent
evidence suggests that the phenomenon can be traced to the
neurological level.118 As Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson explains:
[F]or most people, when they are observing faces, there is
greater activity in the fusiform region of the brain (which is
the region in which face recognition takes place) when a
person tries to recognize a person of the same race as when
he or she tries to recognize a person of another race. This
probably explains much of why cross-racial identifications
are less reliable; the brain just isn’t working as hard.119
Minority group members may be particularly adept at
distinguishing between, for example, the description of an intruder
115. Id. At 1110 (citing Jennifer Crocker et al., Belief in U.S. Government
Conspiracies Against Blacks Among Black and White College Students:
Powerlessness or System Blame?, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
941, 946 app. A (1999)).
116. See id. at 1111 (“One possible explanation for these disparities, which
the authors recognized, was differential knowledge of historical instances of
racial discrimination . . . .”).
117. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1493 (“The phenomenon of unreliable cross-racial
identifications is universally accepted as fact by psychologists.”).
118. Professor Matthew Lieberman and colleagues conducted an experiment
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology to measure the
level of amygdala activity of participants after seeing a black versus a white
face. The amygdala is a region of the brain that mediates emotional responses,
including perceived threats. Lieberman found that amygdala activity in both
white and black participants increased when shown a black face versus a white
face. The authors concluded that the most plausible explanation for this
universal increase in amygdala activity is due to the activation of “culturally
learned negative associations regarding African-Americans.” Matthew D
Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related Amygdala Activity in
African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 720, 722 (2005), available at http://www.scn.ucla.edu/pdf/
nature%20neuroscience%20press/nn1465.pdf (last visited October 19, 2011).
119. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v.
Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 178, 193–94 (2007).
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or attacker made to the police and a black defendant who has
similar Afrocentric features but is not the offender.
It is also plausible that minority group members would be
better able to contextualize and evaluate culturally specific
language or actions. Two studies from the implicit social cognition
literature suggest that the race of the defendant affects the way
jurors remember events and interpret ambiguous evidence.
Professor Justin Levinson conducted an elegant experiment to test
whether implicit race bias impacted jurors’ memories of case
facts.120 Levinson provided jury-eligible participants with a
fictional story about a confrontation between two men. Some
jurors read about “William” the white defendant, while others read
about “Tyrone” the black defendant. The rest of the story remained
constant. But, when Levinson asked jurors to remember pertinent
facts from “the confrontation,” he found that the race of the
defendant impacted how participants recalled the story’s details.
Participants more frequently remembered aggressive details when
Tyrone, rather than William, was the defendant. Levinson
concluded “that the race of a civil plaintiff or a criminal defendant
can act implicitly to cause people to misremember a case’s facts in
racially biased ways.”121 The participants appeared to remember
“facts” that did not appear in the story more often when those facts
were stereotype-consistent, such as facts that portray black males
as aggressive.122
In another study, Professor Levinson and Danielle Young
tested whether implicit race bias impacts jurors’ interpretation of

120. Justin Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision
Making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007). On the strength and
scope of implicit bias generally, see Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji, Fair
Measures: a Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1063 (2006) (“Seventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of Blacks)
show anti-Black bias . . . . These results contrast sharply with the views
expressed on explicit surveys. These data, as well as the findings in dozens of
experiments that meet the criteria of replicability and peer-review, demonstrate
that we are not color or gender blind, and perhaps that we cannot be.”); id. at
1072 (“As disturbing as this evidence [of implicit bias] is, there is too much of it
to be ignored. Moreover, recent discoveries regarding malleability of bias
provide the basis to imagine both individual and institutional change.”). The two
paragraphs discussing Justin Levinson’s studies were originally published in
footnotes in Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the
Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, n. 243 (2010).
121. Levinson, supra note 120 at 350.
122. Id.; see also Justin Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind,
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 614–15 (2009).
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ambiguous evidence.123 They provided a group of jury-eligible
participants with a brief background story of a fictional Mini Mart
robbery and then had the participants view three pictures from the
crime scene for four seconds each.124 The first and second pictures
were innocuous. The third picture––the centerpiece of the study––
displayed one masked assailant reaching over the counter with a
gun in his left hand. The only identifiable race-cue for the assailant
is a small section of visible flesh on his forearm. Levinson altered
the skin-tone of the assailant, showing half the participants a lightskinned suspect and the other half a dark-skinned suspect. After
watching the short video, suspects were told that a suspect was
caught, and then provided with a series of ambiguous evidence
about the suspect.125 Levinson asked the participants to rate the
probative value of each piece of ambiguous evidence.
The study produced several results. First, participants shown
the photo of the dark-skinned suspect were significantly more
likely to find ambiguous evidence more probative of guilt.126
Participants who viewed the dark-skinned defendant were also
more likely to believe that the suspect was guilty, both on a scale
of 1-100 and by a traditional guilty / not guilty measure.127 As the
authors concluded, these results undermine the foundational
assumption that guilt is weighed solely based on the probative
strength of the evidence.128

123. Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA.
L. REV. 307 (2010).
124. This is the background story:
The defendant has been charged with armed robbery. The incident
occurred at 11pm on December 18, 2008, when the Quick Stop Mini
Mart was robbed by two armed men wearing masks. According to the
police report, the owner of the Mini Mart had just closed the store when
two armed men barged into the store. One of the men pointed the gun at
the owner while the other walked behind the counter to the cash
register. The owner obeyed all of the men’s commands and was not
injured. The men left the store with approximately $550 in cash. They
fled in a dark blue 4-door full sized sedan.
Id. at 331–32.
125. For example, (1) the defendant used to be addicted to drugs; (2) the
defendant has been served with a notice of eviction from his apartment; (3) the
defendant is left-handed; (4) the defendant was a youth Golden Gloves boxing
champion in 2006; (4) the defendant is a member of an anti-violence
organization; (5) the defendant does not have a driver’s license or car. Id. at
332–33.
126. Id. at 337.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 339.
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When life experiences cause viewpoints to differ on critical
issues that arise during a trial,129 a non-unanimous decision rule
allows the majority to bypass meaningful consideration of a
perspective that might be difficult to swallow (and thus take time to
explain and understand), based on their respective life
experiences.130 As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in State
v. Collier, “[b]ecause only ten votes were needed to convict
defendant . . . the prosecutor could have assumed, contrary to
Batson’s admonition that it was unacceptable to do so, that all black
jurors would vote on the basis of racial bias and then purposefully
discriminated by limiting the number of blacks on the jury to
two.”131 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart put it more

129. The Supreme Court, in Turner v. Murray, put the point as follows:
A juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior
might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether the
petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors specified under
Virginia law. Such a juror might be less favorably inclined toward . . .
mitigating [evidence]. . . . Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred
up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to
favor the death penalty.
476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986); see also R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, & Lee
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2006) (“Psychologists have documented and explored the
longstanding stereotype of African Americans as violent and prone to
criminality. Indeed, this is the stereotype most commonly applied to Blacks— or
at least to young Black males.”).
130. See Robinson, supra note 114, at 1093 (“While many whites expect
evidence of discrimination to be explicit, and assume that people are colorblind
when such evidence is lacking, many blacks perceive bias to be prevalent and
primarily implicit.”); id. (“[O]utsiders and insiders tend to perceive allegations of
discrimination through fundamentally different psychological frameworks. A
workplace may be spatially integrated and yet employees who work side by side
may perceive an allegation of discrimination through very different lenses because
of their disparate racial and gender identities.”); id. at 1120 (“[R]acialized pools
[of information] are evident at many levels, including the family, media sources,
and the workplace. Stories of perceived discrimination are often told in all-black
settings, sometimes as a means of group therapy, sometimes as a means of
entertainment, and sometimes as a little bit of both.”).
131. 553 So. 2d 815, 819–20 (La. 1989); see also State v. Cheatteam, 986 So.
2d 738, 745 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2008) (“[The defense] pointed out that it appeared
the prosecutor was attempting to ensure that only two African-Americans would
serve on the jury. And in order to convict, the prosecutor needed only 10
votes.”); but see State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 141 (La. 1996) (“In Collier . . .
the presence of two African-Americans on the defendant’s jury did not
necessarily defeat an inference of discrimination because the verdict only
required a 10-2 vote. By contrast, in this capital case, the jury’s finding had to be
unanimous.”).
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directly: “Nine jurors can simply ignore the views of their fellow
panel members of a different race or class.”132
When delegates at the 1898 Constitutional Convention
assembled the legal architecture to restrict the participation of
black citizens in government, in part by allowing non-unanimous
jury verdicts in criminal cases, the simple explanation was the
belief that black people were inferior to white people and their
participation in government risked degrading the quality of civic
life.133 Today, Louisiana law still allows non-unanimous jury
verdicts in all but death penalty cases. The justifications for the
rule offered today, to the extent that they are offered at all, are not
race-salient, but instead focus on perceived efficiency advantages
(e.g. avoiding deadlock) and the fear of the runaway juror who will
vote to acquit against the evidence. In reality though, the law still
operates to discount the jury service of ordinary black citizens
who, based on divergent experience and an apparent inherent
neurological ability to more accurately identify members of their
own race, may, on the margins, arrive at a different interpretation
of the evidence than would the average white juror.134 In other
words, if you eliminate intent and focus solely on impact, nonunanimous juries today serve the same purpose that white
supremacists intended them to serve when they designed the
system more than a century ago.135
III. PEREMPTORY STRIKES
Lawyers can remove prospective jurors from the jury pool
through either a cause or a peremptory challenge.136 Both parties
possess an unlimited number of cause challenges because no
biased juror should participate in the trial. Whereas cause
132. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(referring to a 9-3 decision rule).
133. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 73–82.
134. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Warren McCleskey’s evidence confronts us with the subtle and
persistent influence of the past. His message is a disturbing one to a society that
has formally repudiated racism, and a frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to
regarding its destiny as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him
at our peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its
influence in the present.”).
135. See Banks & Ford, supra note 51, at 1055 (“Racial injustice inheres in
the entrenched substantive racial inequalities that pervade our society. These
disparities are not primarily a consequence of contemporary racial bias.”).
136. See Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause Against
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 507, 507 (1997).
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challenges must be justified and explained,137 lawyers can use
peremptory strikes to exclude anyone they wish for almost any
reason, and they need not explain the basis for these strikes.138
However, under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, a party’s peremptory strike against a prospective juror
cannot be motivated by race or gender.139
A. The Historical Backdrop
Although the non-unanimous jury verdict policy has apparently
racialized historical foundations, the common-law rule providing
the parties with peremptory strikes appears to pre-date the
founding of this country (and its race-related quandaries). In
England, individuals charged with a crime possessed 35
peremptory strikes, and the Crown had none.140 The availability of
these strikes did not apparently emerge out of a concern with racial
minorities “degrading” politics; instead, they arose to display
“tenderness and humanity to prisoners. . . .”141
In the United States, peremptory challenges were based on the
“common law” tradition established in England.142 As early as
1790, Congress passed laws providing for peremptory strikes in
criminal trials, and the States followed suit.143 Even though
peremptory challenges were not necessarily predestined to racially
discriminate, it is clear that “peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate.’”144
B. Peremptory Strikes in Practice Today
Abundant empirical evidence indicates that peremptory strikes
disproportionately exclude African Americans in criminal trials in
Louisiana. Tulane University Sociology Professor Joel Devine
137. See id. at 507–08.
138. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“The essential nature
of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated,
without inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control.”).
139. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1976) (prohibiting strikes on the
basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting strikes on
the basis of gender).
140. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *347 (1769).
141. Id. at *346.
142. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–16.
143. See id. at 214–16.
144. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953)).
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worked with the Louisiana Capital Assistance Center145 to analyze
the juror-strike patterns of Jefferson Parish Prosecutors across
some 390 trials (involving over 12,000 jurors). The results,
published in a study titled “Blackstrikes,” document a highly
significant statistical correlation between a juror’s race and the
State’s use of peremptory challenges.146 The study revealed that
Jefferson Parish prosecutors struck qualified African-American
prospective jurors at over three times the rate as qualified white
prospective jurors.147
Prosecutors in other parishes also exclude African Americans
from criminal juries at an alarming rate. In St. Tammany Parish,
the strike rate against African Americans appears comparable to
that uncovered in Jefferson Parish. “In a review of first-degree and
second-degree murder cases from a recent fifteen-year span,
defense attorneys found that the prosecutors in that jurisdiction had
peremptorily struck 68% of qualified African-American jurors
compared to 19% of qualified white jurors.”148 And, “the records
from two recent death-penalty cases in Caddo Parish show that the
trend may also occur there: the State struck 73% (11 of 15) of
qualified African-Americans from those two jury pools.”149
Although research from other parishes is desirable, the trend is
reflected across the South generally,150 and it reflects serious antiparticipation effects to the prosecutors’ use of peremptory
challenges.

145. The Louisiana Capital Assistance Center was formerly named the
Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center. See About the Louisiana Capital Assistance
Center, THEJUSTICECENTER.ORG, http://www.thejusticecenter.org/lcac.
146. RICHARD BOURKE, JOE HINGSTON & JOEL DEVINE, LA. CRISIS
ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE (2003), available at http://www.blackstrikes.com/resources/report/
black_strikes_report_september_2003.doc.
147. Id.
148. Bidish Sarma, An Enduring (and Disturbing) Legacy: Race-Neutrality,
Judicial Apathy, and the Civic Exclusion of African-Americans in Louisiana, 1
HLRE 49, 56 n.30 (citing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 214, Hoffman v.
Cain, Civil Action No. 2007-1913 (La. 12/12/08)).
149. Id. (citing State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511, 513 (La. 2007) (“[T]he
defendant based his Batson challenge on the fact that the prosecution used six of
its eight peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective jurors.”),
and Brief of Petitioner-Appellant on Appeal at 39, State v. Dorsey, No. 2010KA-0216 (La. 2010), 2010 WL 6775737 (“[F]ive of the seven AfricanAmericans available were struck by the State.”)).
150. See generally ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 37.
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C. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Enforcement
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky,
trial courts engage in a three-step analysis when a party alleges that
the other side has discriminated against prospective jurors on the
basis of race.151 At step one, the court must decide if the party
alleging discrimination has made a prima facie case. The burden to
establish a prima facie case is a light one.152 If the trial court finds
that a prima facie case exists, at step two the party striking jurors
must provide race-neutral reasons for the strike.153 Even if the
reasons are ridiculous, they will pass muster at step two so long as
they are neutral.154 Finally, if race-neutral reasons are provided, the
trial court must determine at step three whether the reasons are
credible and whether the party alleging discrimination has carried
its burden of persuasion.155 The Batson framework should provide
litigants in Louisiana sufficient Fourteenth Amendment protection,
but it does not.
Take, for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s treatment of
the Black Strikes study. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that statistical and historical evidence is highly relevant,156 the
Louisiana Supreme Court has dismissed such damning evidence of
discrimination in jury selection.157 It has effectively cabined the
significance of this evidence to the trial court’s step-one
determination of a prima facie case, and precluded it from
informing the final inquiry of discriminatory intent. Relying only
on the race-neutrality of a prosecutor’s explanations given at step
two, the Louisiana Supreme Court functionally terminates the
process and forecloses the relevance of statistical and historical
151. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1976).
152. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169–70 (2005).
153. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam).
154. Id. at 767–68 (“The second step of [Batson] does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. . . . ‘Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race-neutral.’”) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360
(plurality opinion)).
155. Id. at 767.
156. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003) [hereinafter
Miller-El I] (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether
the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective
jurors.”).
157. See, e.g., Unpublished Appendix at *10, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d
127 (La. 2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors) (setting aside statistics
and history altogether because “a review of the voir dire record as a whole
indicates the State articulated race and gender-neutral reasons for each of the
eight challenges about which defendant now complains”).
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evidence.158 It rubber-stamps the State’s step-two reasons in the
step-three analysis, and denies the criminal defendant’s claim.159
Contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach, however,
statistics and history are meant to inform the ultimate question
concerning the prosecutor’s intent and credibility.160 Instead, in
Louisiana, a simple race-neutral explanation—even a fantastic or
demonstrably false one—overwhelms the significance of this
evidence.161
For all practical purposes, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
refused to consider a defendant’s claims of discrimination against
African-American jurors except in extraordinary cases where the
prosecutor’s racial bias is downright obvious. For example, in
State v. Coleman, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed where the
State’s reason for striking a black juror was simply not raceneutral.162 There, the prosecutor explained that it struck a
prospective juror who served as a “captain with the fire department
in Bossier City, [because he] filed a lawsuit against the city
alleging institutional discrimination. . . . There is a black defendant
in this case. There are white victims.”163 Similarly, in State v.
Harris, a capital case from Jefferson Parish, the Louisiana
158. Id.; see also State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 236–33 (La. 2010) (rejecting
the power of statistical evidence that “the state used 87% of its peremptory
strikes to challenge non-white prospective jurors, in a venire where non-white
prospective jurors comprised less than 19% of the prospective jurors” by
looking at the merits of every individual Batson challenge).
159. Over twenty years ago, Justice Lemmon warned that such an approach
would devastate Batson. See State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 821 (La. 1989)
(“‘Rubber stamp’ approval of any non-racial explanation, no matter how
whimsical or fanciful, would destroy Batson’s objective to ensure that no citizen
is disqualified from jury service because of his race.”).
160. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342 (noting that statistical evidence could
uphold an ultimate finding of discrimination); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
240–41 (2005) [hereinafter Miller-El II] (considering statistical evidence and
comparative juror analysis in its step-three discussion); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 293 (noting that the Supreme Court “has accepted statistical
disparities as proof of an equal protection violation in the selection of the jury
venire in a particular district”).
161. In the Dressner opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that the
Jefferson Parish prosecutors’ ability to give race-neutral reasons indicated that
they had “a clear intent . . . to distance themselves from the errors of their office
in the past.” Unpublished Appendix at *35, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La.
2010) (No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors). But, even the court’s opinion
acknowledged that when confronted with the historical and statistical evidence
gathered in the Black Strikes study, the prosecutor said, it was a “‘sham of a
study by the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center’ included here to ‘keep it in the
forefront.’” Id. at *34.
162. State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511 (La. 2007).
163. Id. at 514.
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Supreme Court reversed where the prosecutor provided as a reason
to justify a peremptory strike of an African-American juror that he
was “the only single black male on the panel with no children.”164
Beyond these remarkable cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
refused to issue ultimate findings of discrimination. Indeed, in the
case of Allen Snyder, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Louisiana Supreme Court because it failed to identify race
discrimination in jury selection even though the prosecutor’s
explanation for striking an African American was implausible.165
The Louisiana high court’s begrudging approach166 insulates much
discrimination from meaningful scrutiny because cases in which
prosecutors spill the beans by supplying a non-race-neutral
explanation are few and far between.167
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not only resisted finding
discrimination, but it has also actively reversed lower courts that
have tried to remedy racial bias. After the second trial of Lawrence
Jacobs, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the
conviction.168 After a thoughtful review of the precedent and the
voluminous record, the court found that the prosecution’s stated
reasons for striking two African-American jurors were
“implausible” and unsupported by the record.169 The Louisiana
Supreme Court took the case as part of its discretionary docket,
reversed the intermediate court, and reinstated the conviction.170
The message to lower courts that they should not overturn criminal
convictions or undermine prosecutors’ explanations was clear. In
fact, the Fifth Circuit recently heeded the message and denied the

164. State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 2002).
165. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
166. In Snyder, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach replicated the trial
court’s approach. According to the trial court, the prosecutor’s comparison of
Allen Snyder (an African-American defendant) to O.J. Simpson was not racially
significant because the prosecutor had not mentioned the race of the defendant
or the race of O.J. Simpson. State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 846 (La. 1999). At
oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Souter asked, “Now that is not
a critical mind at work, is it?” Oral Argument at 36, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552
U.S. 472 (2007) (No. 06-10119) available at a http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-10119.pdf.
167. See Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993) (“If prosecutors
exist who . . . cannot create a ‘racially neutral’ reason for discriminating on the
basis of race, bar examinations are too easy.”).
168. State v. Jacobs, 13 So. 3d 677 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009), rev’d per
curiam, 32 So. 3d 227 (La. 2010).
169. Id. at 691–92 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009).
170. State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 234 (la. 2010) (per curiam).
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numerous Batson issues that lingered after the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s remand and reprimand.171
D. Strikes Justified by Disparate Questioning and Racially
Disparate Responses Attributable to State Action
Prosecutors are able to reduce the number of African American
citizens who sit on juries by use of ever more sophisticated
questions. For example, in State v. Miller, the prosecution asked
the jurors to rate their feelings of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s
Office on a scale of 1-10. The State struck four prospective black
jurors, but no prospective white jurors, based on the differing
responses to this question.172 This question is race-neutral on its
face, but, as prosecutors know, distrust of the police is more
prominent among black citizens than white citizens.173 Part of the
discrepancy stems from first-hand encounters with law
enforcement that the black citizen interpreted to be racist, either
explicitly (e.g., use of terms with racial meaning, such as “nigger”
or “boy”) or vicariously (e.g., being stopped for “driving while
black”).174 Second-hand stories also account for some of the
attitude differential between white and black citizens, as an
African-American “victim [of discriminatory policing] frequently
shares the account with family and friends in order to lighten the

171. See State v. Jacobs, 67 So. 3d 535 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2011) (rejecting
remaining Batson claims on direct appeal).
172. See Record at 2578, 2665–66 State v. Miller, 2005-1111 (La. 3/10/06),
923 So. 2d 625 (La. 2006) (striking black prospective juror based on a 5 (of 10)
rating of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office); id. at 2904 (same); id. (same); id.
(same, except based on a 7 rating).
173. See, e.g., Peter A. Lyle, Note, Racial Profiling and the Fourth
Amendment: Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure Equal
Protection Under the Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 243, 246 (2001) (“This
combined feeling of anger and dread still resonates deep within the heart of the
black community. In fact, African Americans have endured an uneasy
relationship with American law enforcement for decades.”); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE
DEPARTMENT, xix of Executive Summary (Mar. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf (“[C]ommunity members,
especially members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities . . . expressed to us
their deep distrust of and sense of alienation from the police.”).
174. See DAVID A. HARRIS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (1999), available at
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations
-highways; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120
YALE L.J. 728, 795 (2011) (noting that “calling an African-American man a ‘boy’
can be racially derogatory”).
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burden.”175 This sharing can “create a domino effect of anguish
and anger rippling across an extended group.”176 The social science
literature also suggests that these negative attitudes toward the
police tend to be cumulative, with the initial impression providing
a durable frame with which future interactions are viewed, and
influenced by place, with a strong correlation between negative
police attitudes and neighborhood disadvantage.177
175. Joe R. Feagin et al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of
Middle Class African-Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313, 1331 (2001).
176. Id. at 1355; see also Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black
People”: African American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (2007) (“Specifically, African-Americans
and Hispanics were more likely to acquire adverse vicarious information from
family, friends, and neighbors, whereas whites were apt to receive such reports
from the media. In addition, [researchers] note that respondents’ original
assessments of police not only played an important role in how they interpreted
subsequent personal and vicarious experiences but also helped shape their longterm attitudes toward police.”).
177. Negative attitudes towards the police appear to be strongest among
black youth. In an effort to explore why, Professors Rod Brunson and Ronald
Weitzer interviewed forty black teenagers from an inner-city neighborhood
marked by concentrated poverty. See Brunson, supra note 176, at 71. He found
that “83% of study participants reported having experienced harassment
themselves, and 93% reported that someone they knew had been harassed or
mistreated.” Id. at 80 n.8. Not only did the black youth report feeling overpoliced, but the interactions themselves were a source of animosity, as
respondents reported harsh and demeaning verbal treatment, and overaggressive compliance techniques, such as making the youth lie down on the
pavement and submit to being searched during routine pedestrian and traffic
stops. Id. at 83–85. Brunson quotes three of the adolescent respondents who
collectively shape a troubling portrait of the relationship between those sworn to
protect and the citizens whom they are supposed to serve:
“I don’t trip off the police ‘cuz I know they ignorant.” Jermaine replied,
“It make me feel mad that just looking suspicious will get you pulled
over.” And Andrew explained, “I start feeling violated sometimes, but
then I think, nah, that’s something I should expect ‘cuz that’s just the
police. I figure since they got some authority and can do whatever they
want to do, they gonna do it.”
Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
The Department of Justice Report on the NOPD echoes this lack of respect
for the public. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION,
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, xix of Executive
Summary (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
nopd_report.pdf (“Outside the Department, community members, especially
members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities, and the LGBT communities,
expressed to us their deep distrust of and sense of alienation from the police.”);
id. at 102 (“Minority community groups nearly uniformly said that the police
rarely reach out to them, for any purpose. One member of a Vietnamese
community organization reported that ‘[a] lot of the young Vietnamese people
who get shot in this community, we know who shot them but the New Orleans
police don’t do anything. They don’t talk to us. They don’t build community
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Racialized policing in Louisiana contributes to minority group
members feeling differently about law enforcement.178 In March
2011, the United States Department of Justice released its findings
from an extensive civil investigation of the New Orleans Police
Department (“The Report”). Orleans Parish is just across the
Crescent City Connection from Jefferson Parish. Orleans is a
majority-minority community, with a 60.2% black population.179
“Far too often,” the DOJ Report began, “officers show a lack of
respect for the civil rights and dignity of the people of New
Orleans. . . . [T]oo many officers of every rank either do not
understand or choose to ignore the boundaries of constitutional
policing.”180 The Report emphasized the “troubling disparities in
[the] treatment of the City’s African-American community,”181 and
concluded that the “NOPD . . . failed to take sufficient steps to
detect, prevent, or address bias-based profiling and other forms of
discriminatory policing on the basis of race . . . .”182

relationships.’”) (alteration in original); id. (citing an anonymous member of
NOPD’s leadership: “I’m trying to get officers to understand that the public just
wants to know why they are being detained, the purpose of the citation, what are
my recourses and just show me some professionalism, and some courtesy, and
some respect. The public is hungry for this type of interaction.”).
178. Racialized policing in New Orleans is not limited to the city’s black
residents. The DOJ report noted that “NOPD’s lack of a formal and
comprehensive plan to serve individuals who have limited English proficiency
results in the provision of inferior and, in some instances, no police assistance to
a growing segment of the City’s population.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT
41 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_
report.pdf.; see also id. at 41–42 (“No one in the Department was able to
articulate how NOPD serves LEP residents when one of the “unofficial”
interpreters is off-duty, in court, or otherwise unavailable.”); id. at 42 (“At one
community meeting, a monolingual Spanish speaker reported calling police on
four different nights regarding domestic violence, but receiving a response only
once. She attributed the lack of response to the Department’s failure to
understand her. At another meeting, a participant said that she was arrested in
front of her small child after failing to comprehend and follow an officer’s
orders.”).
179. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: Orleans Parish,
Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
180. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, v of Executive Summary (March 16,
2011), available at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ nopd_report.pdf.
181. Id. at 35.
182. Id. at ix of Executive Summary.
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E. The Detrimental Effects of Prosecutorial Exclusion of African
Americans
Discriminatory exclusion impacts not only the stricken jurors
and the defendant on trial but also “the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.”183 Research indicates that the public loses confidence in
the system when minorities are unfairly excluded from juries. In
2006, Professor Sam Sommers conducted a mock jury experiment
aimed at measuring the impact of juror diversity on jury
deliberations and outcomes.184 He used 200 jury-eligible
participants, who, with the help of local judges and jury-pool
administrators, were recruited largely at a Michigan courthouse
where the jurors had arrived for jury service.185 Sommers first
divided participants into two types of juries: homogeneous juries
(six white jurors) and heterogeneous juries (four white jurors and
two black jurors).186 He then provided each jury with either a raceneutral or race-salient voir dire questionnaire.187 Next, he showed
each jury a 30-minute Court-TV video trial summary of a black
defendant in a sexual assault case.188 Each jury then heard an
experimenter read jury instructions and remind the jurors that their
objective was to reach unanimity.189 Finally, Sommers asked each
jury to deliberate for 60 minutes.190
Before deliberations, 41% of participants indicated that they
felt the defendant was guilty.191 30.7% of jurors on heterogeneous
juries returned guilty verdicts compared to 50.5% of jurors on allwhite juries.192 In the study, white jurors assigned to diverse juries
returned guilty verdicts less frequently than white jurors serving on
all white juries.193 Heterogeneous juries also performed better
across every measure of thoroughness and accuracy: The four
white and two black juries deliberated longer (50.67 minutes
183. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1976).
184. Sameul R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 597–612 (2006), available at http://ase.tufts.
edu/psychology/documents/pubssommersonracialdiversity.pdf.
185. Id. at 602.
186. Id. at 601.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 602.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 603.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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versus 38.49 minutes), discussed more case facts (30.48 versus
25.93), made fewer factually inaccurate statements (4.14 versus
7.28), had fewer factual inaccuracies left uncorrected (1.36 versus
2.49), cited more “missing” evidence (1.87 versus 1.07), raised
more race-related issues (3.79 versus 2.07), discussed possible
racism more freely (1.35 versus .93), and displayed less resistance
at the very mention of racism (22% of comments met with
resistance versus 100%) than all-white juries.194 While black jurors
raised race-related issues (e.g. the role of race in police
investigations) most often, white jurors on diverse, heterogeneous
juries raised these issues much more frequently than white jurors
on all-white juries.195 Interestingly, white jurors serving on diverse
juries raised the possibility of racism more than both black jurors
and white jurors on all-white juries.196
Sommers’s results converged with other findings on the effects
of racial diversity on jury outcomes. Professor William Bowers
studied 74 capital jury trials involving a black defendant and a white
victim, and found that juries with four or more white jurors have a
much higher death sentencing rate than juries with two or more
black jurors.197 Simply adding a single black male altered the
deliberation outcomes: juries with no black male members imposed
death sentences in over 71% of cases.198 When at least one black
person served on the jury, that number plummeted to 42.9%.199
Nevertheless, given the trajectory of Louisiana’s Batson
jurisprudence, prosecutors will remain free to discriminate on the
basis of race, so long as they do not divulge a race-based reason on
the record.200 The anti-participation impact appears significant
where, in many Louisiana parishes, prosecutors are excluding
African Americans at three or four times the rate of white jurors.201
Even though the availability of peremptory challenges was not
originally intended to dilute the participation of racial minorities, it
has that effect today.
194. See id. at 605.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 605–606.
197. William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look At
The Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant is Black
and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2004).
198. William J. Bowers et al., Death-Sentencing in Black and White: An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193 (2001).
199. Id.
200. See supra Part III.C. The issue becomes even more troublesome because
there is evidence that prosecutors strike African-American jurors as a result of
unconscious bias. See infra Part IV.D.
201. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. DEATH-QUALIFICATION
In cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, prospective
jurors are “death-qualified.” Experts have summarized the process
of death-qualification:
Jury selection in capital cases includes the process of
“death qualification.” Unless a prospective juror can be
death qualified s/he will be excluded from the jury. During
“death qualification” a potential juror is questioned about
her/his attitudes toward the death penalty. When a potential
juror’s views on the death penalty will preclude her/him
from rendering a verdict based on the law and the evidence,
the juror cannot be “death qualified” and is excluded.202
In short, death-qualification weeds out those prospective jurors
whose views on the death penalty––pro or anti––will impair them
from fairly considering the evidence put forth by the parties.
A. The Historical Backdrop
A conscientious objection to a particular law or form of
punishment was not a basis for a citizen to be excluded from jury
service either in England or at the formation of the Common Law
in the United States.203 The formation of the practice of excluding
jurors who oppose capital punishment from juries in death penalty
cases has a strong racial component. The 1859 Virginia trial of
abolitionist John Brown reflects one of the earliest recorded
instances of “death qualifying” the jury pool.204 Times had
changed, and slavery states had to fight vigorously against the
abolitionist movement. John Brown and other “evil-minded and
traitorous persons” faced trial for “maliciously and feloniously
advis[ing] slaves to rebel and make insurrection against their
masters and owners, and against the Government and the
Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.”205 The
following question was put to potential jurors: “Have you any
conscientious scruples against convicting a party of an offense to
202. Rick Seltzer et al., The Effect of Death-Qualification on the Propensity
of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 HOW. L.J. 571, 573–74 (1986).
203. See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of DeathQualification, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87 (2008).
204. Id. at n.42 (citing The Trial of John Brown, in THE LIFE, TRIAL AND
EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN JOHN BROWN KNOWN AS “OLD BROWN OF
OSSAWATOMIE” WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE ATTEMPTED INSURRECTION AT
HARPER’S FERRY 55–59 (Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (1859)).
205. Trial of John Brown, supra note 204, at 55–58.
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which the law assigns the punishment of death, merely because
that is the penalty assigned?”206 The trial judge and the parties
must have understood that the “conscientious scruples” of a wouldbe abolitionist sympathizer juror could derail the inevitable death
sentence against John Brown and send the wrong message to
abolitionists.
B. Death-Qualification Today
The scope of death-qualification has narrowed since the trial of
John Brown. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,
held that a “sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen
for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the
death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction.”207 Today the process of death-qualification
means eliminating from the jury any citizen who would be
“substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death
penalty under the state-law framework.”208 Despite the
modification in scope, modern death-qualification functions to
eliminate a disproportionate number of black citizens from jury
duty in capital cases.
Death-qualified jurors generally tend to be white.209 This is not
solely a function of the greater population of white residents, as
black people are more likely to be eliminated through deathqualification than are white people based upon attitudes toward
capital punishment.210 Anecdotal and statistical evidence from two
recent capital trials in two different Louisiana parishes supports
that the proposition is true in Louisiana. In State v. Dorsey, a 2009
capital trial out of Caddo Parish—a parish with a population that is
206. Id. at 63.
207. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
208. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).
209. See Alicia Summers et al., Death Qualification as Systematic Exclusion
of Jurors With Certain Religious and Other Characteristics, 40 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 3218 (2010).
210. See Melynda Price, Performing Discretion or Discrimination: Race,
Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 57, 103–04 (2009) (“[P]ersons who oppose the death penalty are not evenly
distributed throughout the population. As a result, African Americans are more
likely to be disqualified from service based on attitudes toward the death
penalty.”); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46
(1984) (finding that death-qualified juries are more likely to exclude women and
African-American men).
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49% white and 47% African-American211—only 8 of 36 (22%)
Witherspoon-qualified jurors were African-American.212 In State v.
Dressner, out of Jefferson Parish, 25% of black jurors were
Witherspoon-disqualified compared to 20% of prospective white
jurors.213
The anti-participation effects of death-qualification on black
citizens is particularly troubling given the centrality of citizenjurors to the evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As Justice
Scalia wrote, dissenting in Roper v. Simmons, “juries maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal
system that [the] Court cannot claim for itself.”214 Not only are
black citizens more likely to be excluded from death penalty
juries215; also, because black citizens constitute a minority
(number) of citizens, the majority of black citizens who oppose
capital punishment are unable to exact policy change in
legislatures.216 What makes the dilution of the black community’s
211. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & Country QuickFacts: Caddo Parish,
Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22017.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2011).
212. Brief for Appellant at 39, State v. Dorsey (No. 2010-KA-0216) (on file
with Louisiana Supreme Court and with authors).
213. Brief for Appellant at __, State v. Dressner, 45 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010)
(No. 08-KA-1366) (on file with authors).
214. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation omitted); see also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 35 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting that “[m]illions of Americans oppose the
death penalty” and that “[a] cross section of virtually every community in the
country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who
nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases”); Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The prosecutorial concern that
death verdicts would rarely be returned by 12 randomly selected jurors should
be viewed as objective evidence supporting the conclusion that the penalty is
excessive.”); Cohen & Smith, supra note 203, at 120–21 (“Death-qualification
eliminates from juries those citizens who would find a death sentence to be cruel
and unusual either generally or in a particular context. As a result, when
appellate courts review the frequency with which juries impose a death sentence
for a certain class of capital crimes, that measure is necessarily an inaccurate
thermometer for determining how much a society has chilled to the idea of
executing a certain class of offenders.”).
215. Even when African-American prospective jurors are death-qualified,
their responses during death-qualification, which may indicate some hesitation
towards handing out capital punishment, render them susceptible to being struck
peremptorily. See Price, supra note 210, at 100–01.
216. See Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a
Violation of the Rights of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 49–50 (2006)
(“Taken together, the unequal numbers in executions, and in excludable death
penalty beliefs, mean that the most powerful members of society are deciding
whether the death penalty should be allowed, who should be executed, and who
should be allowed to participate in the decision process. Those who are opposed
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voice even more troubling is that the fact that black citizens in
Louisiana––and nationally––tend to disapprove of capital
punishment relative to white citizens is not accidental or random:
African Americans who remember slavery and lynching, or who
live in areas where racial profiling and police intimidation are still
the norms, are often reticent to impose a death sentence.217
C. The Reasons Many African Americans Are Not Death-Qualified
are Attributable to State Action
The link between the death penalty and historical lynching
likely influences the attitudes of black citizens on capital
punishment. Between 1882 and 1968, close to 5,000 Americans
were lynched, overwhelmingly in Southern states.218 Three out of
every four victims were black.219 There were 95 reported lynchings
in Louisiana between 1889 and 1896, the victim was black in
roughly 85% of those cases.220 The noose evokes images of fear,
intimidation, brutality, hatred, bigotry, mob rule, and
lawlessness—the ugliest aspects of a racial past we would like to
believe we have overcome. The powerful images of lynching
continue to surface today. In September 2007, the nation’s
attention turned to the small town of Jena, Louisiana where 20,000
people assembled to protest the prosecution of six young black
men. Many heralded the moment as an opportunity to revitalize the
civil rights movement and to reawaken a new generation to the
racial bias and unequal treatment that continues to taint our

to the death penalty are not only in a minority group by belief, but in the power
to effect change in society. They are deprived of the legislative means to end the
death penalty due to social weakness, and then also deprived of access to the
jury, the last forum which could be of use to them.”).
217. See, e.g., Price, supra note 210, at 103–04; see also David C. Baldus et
al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 19 n.40 (2001).
218. Charles J. Ogletree, Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty
in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15 (2002) (noting that “the Tuskegee Institute
estimates that nearly 5,000 lynchings took place between 1882 and 1968”).
219. See, e.g., Sarah A. Soule, Populism and Black Lynching in Georgia,
1890–1900, 71 SOC. F. 431, 431 (1992–1993) (noting that 78% of lynching
victims across the United States between 1889–1900 were black).
220. James M. Inverarity, Populism and Lynching in Louisiana, 1889–1896:
A Test of Erikson's Theory of the Relationship between Boundary Crises and
Repressive Justice, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 262, 263 tbl. 1 (1976).
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society.221 The incident began when a group of white students
hung several hangman’s nooses under a tree in the high school
yard.222
Racial tensions at the high school already were high. After
white students allegedly hurled racial epithets at black students, a
fight broke out, and a white student was kicked and punched by a
group of six black students. The white student briefly lost
consciousness. These black students—a bunch that included
honors students and star athletes—were initially prosecuted for
attempted murder. No charges were pressed against the white
students who placed the noose in the yard. In an op-ed piece
published in the New York Times the local District Attorney, Reed
Walters, acknowledged the source of the outrage, writing “I can
understand the emotions generated by the juxtaposition of the
noose incident with the attack on Mr. Barker and the outcomes for
the perpetrators of each.”223 He continued:
I cannot overemphasize how abhorrent and stupid I find the
placing of the nooses on the schoolyard tree in late August
2006. If those who committed that act considered it a
prank, their sense of humor is seriously distorted. It was
mean-spirited and deserves the condemnation of all decent
people. But it broke no law. I searched the Louisiana
criminal code for a crime that I could prosecute. There is
none.224
A joke is exactly how two Jefferson Parish assistant district
attorneys described their actions when, in 2003, they wore neckties
depicting a hangman’s noose and grim reaper to the death penalty
221. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1285, 1292 (2008); Joseph Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration,
and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009).
222. Jeannine Bell, The Hangman's Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate Speech
and the Jena Six, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 329, 329 (2009) (“The
controversy in Jena, Louisiana began innocently enough. On August 30, 2006,
administrators at Jena High School held an assembly to discuss rules and
policies for the upcoming year. According to reports, at the end of the assembly
one Black student asked the assistant principal whether Black students were
allowed to sit under the tree in the center of campus. In a description of the
events, a reporter from The Jena Times noted that the question was asked in a
joking manner and that all students, both Black and White, recognized the
question as a joke and laughed. The vice principal told them that they could sit
where they want. The next day, nooses were found hanging from a tree in the
center of the high school’s campus.”) (internal citations omitted).
223. Reed Walters, Editorial, Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/opinion/26walters.htm.
224. Id.
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trial of a boy who was only sixteen years old at the time of the
crime. The father of the defendant found the ties, especially the
noose, to be clearly racist, saying “I mean, who else got strung
up?”225
The noose is not the only symbol that reopens the wounds of
racialized violence and inequality. In the four decades since he
arrived in Louisiana, Carl Staples had not been called for jury duty
a single time.226 On May 11, 2009, Mr. Staples appeared at the
court, after finally being called to serve.227 Outside the main
entrance to the courthouse, the Confederate flag welcomed visitors
and veterans of the court alike.
During jury selection in a death penalty case, Mr. Staples
explained to the court why that Confederate flag left him unable to
take part in the administration of justice:
[The flag is] a symbol of one of the most, to me, one of the
most heinous crimes ever committed to another member of
the human race and I just don’t see how you could say . . .
you’re here for justice and then again you continue to
overlook this great injustice by continuing to fly this flag
which continues to . . . put salt in the wounds . . . of people
of color. I don’t buy it. I don’t buy it.228
The Assistant District Attorney successfully moved to strike
Mr. Staples from the jury for cause (meaning that his opinion
rendered him unqualified to serve as a juror).229 These symbols, the
noose and the Confederate flag, remind black citizens of the
savage inequalities that the state and federal government tolerated
(and even promoted).230 Unfortunately, these insults are not
225. Jeffrey Gettleman, Prosecutors’ Morbid Neckties Stir Criticism, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A14.
226. See, e.g., Cecelia Trenicosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie:
How the Courthouse Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana,
27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 125 (2011), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734397## (describing the reaction of
Carl Staples, a black resident of Shreveport, Louisiana, to seeing the
Confederate flag in front of the Caddo Parish district courthouse as he reported
for jury duty on May 11, 2009).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 37–38 (SSRN Pages).
229. Id. 38.
230. Exposure to these hateful symbols does not only reopen old wounds but
also can be detrimental to a black citizen’s mental and physical health. Elizabeth
Brondolo et al., Perceived Racism and Blood Pressure: A Review of the
Literature and Conceptual and Methodological Critique, 25 ANNALS OF
BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 61 (2003) (“Findings from CVR studies are clearer.
These studies suggest that acute exposure to racism is associated with increases
in cardiovascular activation. In addition, past exposure to racism may influence

402

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

isolated events, but the type of pain that is likely to be experienced
over and over again throughout one’s life.231
D. The Detrimental Effects of Excluding African-American Jurors
from Death Penalty Trials
The exclusion of black citizens from juries is likely to blame, at
least in part, for the disparities that continue to exist in criminal
sentencing in Louisiana. Justice Scalia has referred to the
“undeniable reality” that “all groups tend to have particular
sympathies and hostilities—most notably, sympathies toward their
own group members.”232 This phenomenon is known as ingroup
bias. Professor Jerry Kang writes that “[i]ngroup bias is so strong
that people explicitly report liking ‘ingroups’ even when they are
randomly assigned to them . . . [and] even when the groups are
made up.”233 The lack of representation of one’s own race on a
jury can be detrimental in two ways. First, white jurors might
sympathize with white victims more than they do black victims.
This might contribute to the race of the victim effect recently
documented in Caddo and East Baton Rouge Parishes. It might
also inhibit white jurors from experiencing an empathic response
to mitigating evidence presented by black defendants.
There is some experimental evidence to bolster the
explanation. A recent study used transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to measure corticospinal activity level in participants who
were shown short video clips of a needle entering into the hand of

current CVR to race-related and other stressors.”); id. (“Frequent, negative, and
potentially race-related interpersonal exchanges can have a cumulative toll on
health because they may elicit repeated demands for both anger and active
coping. Attributional processes may influence the degree to which individuals
anticipate these encounters and believe they can cope with them.”).
231. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Four Observations About Hate
Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 367 (2009) (“Like water dripping on
stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times
before. Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be
raw.”); Id. at 368 (“Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its
victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand
scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton
criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of
one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility
and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a
system of free expression.”).
232. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, n.37 (2010).
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either a white or black target.234 Consistent with the ingroup
empathic bias explanation, researchers here found that region
specific brain activity levels are higher when a white participant
views the clip of a white participant experiencing pain than when a
white target sees a clip of a black target being subjected to pain.235
Significantly brain activity level ratings in response to witnessing
outgroup member pain correlates with a participant's score on the
Implicit Association Test, which the authors interpreted as
evidence that this neuro-response is culturally learned rather than
automatic.236
The second disadvantage that flows from the exclusion of
black jurors in capital trials is that white jurors might treat black
defendants more harshly. Thus, as Justice Thomas explained in
Georgia v. McCollum, “securing representation of the defendant’s
race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the
defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.”237 One reason
why black citizens receive harsher punishments is because of the
perception that blacks are both less than human and prone to
violence.238 Prosecutors play into these stereotypes by referring to
defendants in animalistic terms. For example, in Darden v.
Wainwright,239 the Court noted the prosecution’s reference to the
capital defendant in that case as an “animal” that “shouldn’t be out
of his cell unless he has a leash on him.” Other instances include
references to “animals” who armed themselves to shoot “white
honkies,”240 a “blood crazed animal who hovered over [the
victim’s] grave,”241 and a “pervert, a weasel and a moron” “who
raped his mother’s friend, would rape a dog and would rape each
and every member of the jury.”242 In a recent Louisiana case,243 the
234. Alessio Avenanti, Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance
with Other Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018 (2010), available at http://
www.alessioavenanti.com/pdf_library/Avenanti_2010CurrBiol_MainText.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
238. See e.g. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and
Visual Processing. 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 6 (2004) (noting the
stereotypical belief that black citizens are hostile, violent and prone to
criminality); Philip A. Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge,
Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 306 (2008) (discussing the historical
belief—and present day implicit bias—that black citizens are less human than
white citizens).
239. 477 U.S. 168, 192 (1986).
240. State v. Wilson, 404 So.2d 968, 969 (La. 1981).
241. People v. Martinez, 377 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978).
242. People v. Garreau, 189 N.E.2d 287, 391 (Ill. 1963).
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prosecution referred to the black capital defendant as “[a]nimals
like that (indicating)” and implored the jury to “be a voice for the
people of this Parish” and to “send a message to that jungle.”244
The use of animal imagery in reference to the accused stirs up
the exact type of emotional response that the Supreme Court
indicated trial courts should take pains to avoid: the kind that
allows citizens to stop pondering the accused as an individual
human being.245 Again, there is experimental evidence that nonhuman references to capital defendants influences the severity of
the punishment imposed. Working from a dataset of more than 600
capital cases that proceeded to the penalty phase in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania between 1979 and 1999, Professors Philip Goff and
Jennifer Eberhardt measured the frequency of dehumanizing,
animalistic references to black capital defendants with similar
references to white death-eligible defendants.246 The results are
disturbing. Press coverage of black capital defendants (from the
Philadelphia Inquirer) included, on average, nearly four times the
number of dehumanizing references per article than articles
covering white capital defendants. More disturbing still, there is a
direct and strong correlation between the number of times an
animalistic reference was made and the likelihood that the
defendant was sentenced to death.247 The increased presence of
black jurors could help offset the destructive impact.
V. THE INTER-RELATEDNESS OF NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS,
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, AND DEATH QUALIFICATION
Each of the policies discussed above, as well as the practices that
continue in part because of the residual impact of those policies,
independently denigrate the quality of justice administered in

243. State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471 (La. 2002) (transcripts containing the
prosecutor’s references are on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court and the
authors).
244. As another example of this line of thinking, “[o]ne of the officers who
participated in the Rodney King beating of 1991 had just come from another
incident in which he referred to a domestic dispute involving a Black couple as
‘something right out of Gorillas in the Mist.’” Goff et al., supra note 238, at 292.
245. See id. (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340, n.7 (1985))
(discussing the “highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding
the punishment that a particular person deserves”).
246. See Goff et al., supra note 238, at 292.
247. Id. at 304; id. at 305 (“despite the fact that we controlled for a
substantial number of factors that are known to influence criminal sentencing,
these apelike representations were associated with the most profound outcome
of intergroup dehumanization: death”).
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Louisiana by disproportionately excluding the voice of black
citizens. Worse, these policies and practices are mutually
reinforcing, creating cycles of exclusion. The most powerful voices
in the legislature—and most of the time their most powerful
constituents—do not live in areas of concentrated poverty and
violence. The legislature makes laws, many fear-based, to punish
and protect against violence that occurs in many of the areas where
the legacy of slavery and second-class citizenship have created
intergenerational poverty among citizens of color. Citizens are
called to judge defendants charged with violating these laws, but
prosecutors successfully eliminate many people of color through
discriminatory jury selection even though many live in the areas
where the crimes are committed, understand the police conduct in
those areas, and live with the situational pressures and constraints
that define such locations.
Consider how the cycle of exclusion feeds itself. Suppose a
particular neighborhood is disproportionately poor. Historical
discrimination has resulted in intergenerational poverty, low levels
of education, and high unemployment rates among African
Americans. These disadvantages result in a clustering of African
Americans in the neighborhood. The comparative socioeconomic
disadvantage of the neighborhood drives elevated crime rates. In
turn, law enforcement increases patrolling of the area. Although
blacks and whites use drugs at comparable rates, the increased
police presence results in more arrests of black citizens from drug
offenses.
In Louisiana, possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor
offense.248 However, if a person is arrested for marijuana
possession, second offense, the district attorney possesses the
discretion to choose whether to charge the crime again as a “first
offense,” resulting only in a misdemeanor conviction, or the
prosecutor can choose to charge the same possession as a
marijuana “second offense,” which is a felony that carries a
maximum of five years imprisonment.249 This discretion exists
regardless of the amount of marijuana involved. When the
prosecutor is faced with the decision of whether to charge the
marijuana possession as a misdemeanor or a felony, the point that
the offender comes from a neighborhood of concentrated crime
likely weighs on her mind. Furthermore, as the prosecutor reviews
the case file of the black offender, stereotypes of blacks as crime248. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:966 (Supp. 2011)
249. Accord Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2586 (2010)
(commenting that “state criminal codes, like the federal scheme, afford similar
deference to prosecutorial discretion when prescribing recidivist enhancements”).
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prone and dangerous, might influence the decision of how to
charge the crime.
After the offender is charged with marijuana second and
convicted of a felony, the felon juror exclusion rule operates to
cabin the influence of black citizens in the jury box. Louisiana law
prohibits a citizen who has been “convicted of a felony for which
he has not been pardoned” from serving as a juror on a criminal
jury.250 Although the Louisiana constitution mandates full
restoration of the “rights of citizenship” upon “termination of state
and federal supervision following conviction for any offense,”251
the Louisiana Supreme Court does not consider jury service to be a
right of citizenship.252 Thus, skewed enforcement of criminal laws
(for example, disproportionate arrests for drug possession crime
despite equal rates of drug use) has the collateral consequence of
excluding a disproportionate number of black citizens from jury
service.
Those black citizens that are not excluded from jury service by
felon exclusion laws, and are able to find the transportation and
childcare to get to the district courthouse, are often excluded by
prosecutors through peremptory challenges or death-qualification.
Even if a black juror or two is selected onto the jury, the 10-2
verdict rule effectively silences their vote in most Louisiana
Parishes. When the convicted defendant is sent away, families
struggle to make up for lost income and support. When he has
served his time and is released, the convicted citizen will face
seemingly insurmountable obstacles in finding even the most
menial of work. The cycle of poverty and instability persists, and
with a felony record, ex-offenders cannot participate to effectuate
change by sitting in judgment of another defendant on a criminal
jury. Discrimination by design has contributed to self-sustaining
structural inequality.
Rather than fight these battles one-by-one, we should seriously
consider how to effect systemic change. The most obvious
suggestions are to eliminate non-unanimous jury verdicts,
eliminate felony enhancement provisions for status or other minor
offenses, craft effective mechanisms for eliminating racemotivated jury selection (or else abolish peremptory challenges),
and restore the right to serve on a jury, a basic right of citizenship,
250. See State v. Jacobs, 904 So. 2d 82, 91 (2005) (“LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 401
A(5) provides that in order to qualify as a juror, a person must ‘[n]ot be under
indictment for a felony nor have been convicted of a felony for which he has not
been pardoned.’”).
251. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 20.
252. See Jacobs, 904 So. 2d at 91.
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to all ex-offenders. A few discrete alterations cannot solve the race
disparity problems in Louisiana; the larger project requires massive
shifts in the economic, social, and cultural landscape that could
only be accomplished in the long term. Yet, these potential
remedies are cost-effective ways to move in the right direction.
Closing the 1898 Constitutional Convention, E.B. Kruttschnitt
provided solace for those terrified of what the Reconstruction
Amendments meant for the supremacy of the white race in
Louisiana:
I say to you, that we can appeal to the conscience of the
nation, both judicial and legislative and I don’t believe that
they will take the responsibility of striking down the system
which we have reared in order to protect the purity of the
ballot box and to perpetuate the supremacy of the AngloSaxon race in Louisiana.253
As residents of states across the nation pat themselves on the
back for maintaining justice systems that at least pretend to operate
on a different plane than justice systems in the Deep South, we ask
the same question that Kruttschnitt asked more than a century ago:
Who will take responsibility for striking down the system?

253. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 5, at
381.

